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No ka-ching against MV Kiating – Admiralty Court rejects Port of Sheerness’ period toll1 October 2025

Clear drafting is critical, particularly where parties seek to contractually impose significant charges. Earlier this year, the English Admiralty Court delivered a striking decision which relates to a port’s ability to impose a “period toll” against the sub-charterers of an overstaying vessel. Its judgment in Port of Sheerness Limited v Swire Shipping Pte Ltd  [2025] EWHC 7 (Admlty) provides clear guidance on contractual interpretation and interesting commentary on a broader point.

Background

"The English Admiralty Court delivered a striking decision which relates to a port’s ability to impose a 'period toll' against the sub-charterers of an overstaying vessel."

Swire Shipping Ltd (“Swire”) was the sub-charterer and operator of the MV KIATING, which loaded a cargo of plywood and hardwood in late 2021. The intended port of discharge was Tilbury but due to storage limitations, the hardwood was discharged instead at the Port of Sheerness (“the Port”).

The vessel came alongside its berth on 23 January 2022 and discharge commenced the following day. Problems with the stow arising from untied slings and insufficient dunnage (loose wood/matting) meant that discharge operations were substantially delayed. Following a Notice of Protest, discharge was suspended on 28 January by the Port’s health and safety officers. The MV KIATING was twice moved to vacant berths at the Port, before moving to anchorage on 4 February and re-berthing at the Port on 11 February. Discharge was then completed on 12 February, as additional measures were in place to facilitate operations.

The total time taken to discharge was 56.16 hours, substantially more than the Port’s estimate of 42 hours. Consequently, and in reliance upon wording in its contract, the Port sought to impose a period toll of £248,026.22 against Swire. The dual purpose of the toll was to protect the Port against loss and provide an additional revenue source. The interpretation of this wording, which was also included on the Port’s invoice, was the primary issue between the parties to these proceedings.

Analysis of the Period Toll

The Port’s submissions on its entitlement to charge Swire a period toll were fourfold.

  1. The Port was contractually entitled to do so because of Clause 5(4) of the port charges, which provided a period toll was chargeable where “a vessel remains alongside at the docks for a longer period than necessary for loading and discharging of cargo”.
    The court had little hesitation in finding in Swire’s favour that Clause 5(4) did not entitle the Port to a period toll in this case. The court interpreted “remains alongside” in this provision to refer to a vessel which had not departed after completing loading or discharge, and not simply that loading or discharge had taken longer than estimated. Swire’s position was in the court’s view, the practical and commercial approach, while the Port’s contention that the period toll applied as soon as the time necessary to perform operations had expired “would be complex, uncertain, and all-too-readily productive of disagreements.” The court regarded its interpretation as unambiguous, but otherwise applied contra proferentem against the Port as the party who drafted the relevant contract.
  2. The Port had a unilateral power to impose additional charges, relying on terms and conditions which clarified that additional charges would apply where: “There are delays which are outside the control of the Port of Sheerness (e.g. weather stoppages, vessel delays, trimming in vessel hold or lack of provision of customer haulage vehicle etc).”
    The court decided that the wording relied upon by the Port were references to the terms and conditions, rather than any indication that a parallel, freestanding right to impose additional charges had been established.
  3. The Port and Swire had entered into a supplemental agreement to pay both the period toll and an additional hourly rate for cargo handling.
    The court reached the view that, given its interpretation of Clause 5(4) and the consequent non-applicability of the period toll in this case, the supplemental agreement reached in correspondence which referenced the period toll added nothing to the parties’ agreement.
  4. The Port was entitled to a quantum meruit sum reflecting the reasonable value of the services provided to Swire.
    The court held that this argument failed, again because the current situation did not cover those in which the parties had stipulated that additional charges would be payable by Swire, which, in the court’s view, left no room for a quantum meruit payment.

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"The Port claimed that it could recover three times the value of its asserted period toll by reference to the MPAA 1973."

An intriguing subsidiary point

Although this case is seemingly straightforward and one of contractual interpretation on the facts, comment by the court that did not form part of the main reasoning, on the potential for triple recovery under the Medway Ports Authority Act 1973 (the “MPAA 1973”) has been highlighted as a point of possibly more general importance than other subsidiary points addressed by the court.

The Port claimed that it could recover three times the value of its asserted period toll by reference to the MPAA 1973, which provides in relevant part that:

“3. (1) In this Act, unless the subject or context otherwise requires – “charges” includes charges, rates, tolls and dues of every description for the time being payable to the Authority under any enactment;

64. If the owner of any vessel or goods or any other person at any time eludes or evades or attempts to elude or evade payment of, or refuses to pay, any charges payable by such owner or person to the Authority at the time when the same become due and payable, he shall be liable to pay to the Authority a sum equal to three times the amount of such charges, which sum shall be a debt due to the Authority and shall be recoverable by the Authority in any court of competent jurisdiction.

68. In addition to any other remedy given by this Act and by the Harbours Clauses Act, 1847, as incorporated with this Act… the Authority may recover any charges payable to them as a debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.”

The court held that the period toll was not payable “under an enactment” but rather under a contract, thereby avoiding a result the court said would be “manifestly unfair” and without proper justification. In doing so, the court rejected the Port’s contention that the MPAA 1973’s definition of charges was inclusive and not exclusive, such that “charges” did not provide a limitation to the specified categories. There is the possibility that, given the existence of such provisions elsewhere in ports legislation, this question might be re-tested.

"This decision reinforces the point that the courts will take a practical and commercial approach to contractual interpretation."

Key Takeaways

Parties should remember that:

  • this decision reinforces the point that the courts will take a practical and commercial approach to contractual interpretation;
  • a misconception between the parties, even if shared, does not alter a contract’s meaning or contents; and
  • the Admiralty Court is seemingly prepared, arguably with fairness in mind, to adopt an exclusive rather than an inclusive approach to interpreting statutory definitions. However, given the existence of such provisions elsewhere in ports legislation, this position might be tested in a future case.

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