FER X Decree 2026: incentive procedures for RES plants until 31 December 2030 7 August 2026

Within 30 days from the authorisation measure’s date of issuance, the Energy Services Manager – GSE S.p.A. (“GSE”) shall issue the applicant an eligibility opinion for the submission of the request for access to the support mechanism.

COMPETITIVE PROCEDURES MECHANISM

Applications

To participate in a competitive procedure, applicants must submit the relevant applications (i.e. the “expression of interest” and the “application for participation in the competitive procedure”) through the GSE website, together with the following documentation, inter alia:

• an offer to reduce the strike price indicated in the FER X Decree;
• a bid bond equal to 5% of the investment cost, calculated as the product of the specific investment cost values indicated in the relevant table (set out below and in annex 1 of the FER X) and the capacity quota for which access to the support mechanism is requested;
• an undertaking to provide the performance bond, guaranteeing the implementation of the project, and to submit such bond within 30 days of the publication of the successful ranking. The value of the performance bond is equal to 10% of the investment cost, calculated as the product of the specific investment cost values indicated in annex 1 and the capacity quota admitted in an eligible ranking position.

Expressions of interest may be submitted a maximum of three times.

Strike Prices

The strike prices are those provided for under the FER X and reported in the table below (without prejudice to the price adjustment factors established for certain categories of plants):

The strike prices shall be updated by GSE upon publication of each individual tender, using the most up-to-date data relating to the national producer price index for industry, in order to take into account cumulative average inflation between the date of entry into force of the FER X and the month in which the relevant tender is published. The FER X also reserves the right of the Ministry of Environment and Energy Security (“MASE”) to provide for further updates of the strike prices.

Capacity Quotas

The table below sets out the estimated capacity quotas, which remain subject to possible amendments and which will be made available overall for each technology under the competitive procedures:

Following each procedure, GSE shall verify that bids characterised by a price lower than the strike price correspond to at least the target capacity quota increased by 5%.

If this condition is not met, the ranking process shall exclude a capacity equivalent to 5% of the total capacity submitted.

Without prejudice to the overall available capacity quota, for photovoltaic and wind plants with a capacity exceeding 1 MW, MASE shall reserve a capacity quota “calculated at a level equal to at least 30% of the maximum capacity procurable through competitive procedures for such plants during the year in which the procedure is launched” in order to launch dedicated procedures, provided that such projects satisfy, inter alia, the following pre-selection criteria:

a) responsible business conduct, assessed pursuant to Art. 4 of Regulation (EU) 2025/1176;

b) cybersecurity and data security, assessed pursuant to Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) 2025/1176;

c) capability to complete the project in full and within the prescribed timeframe, assessed pursuant to Art. 6 of Regulation (EU) 2025/1176;

d) contribution of the auction to resilience, with reference to the origin of final products and key plant components, assessed pursuant to Art. 7 of Regulation (EU) 2025/1176; and

e) contribution of the auction to sustainability through criteria relating to energy system integration, assessed pursuant to Art. 15 of Regulation (EU) 2025/1176.

Deadlines for commissioning of plants with a capacity of more than 1 MW

Plants participating in competitive procedures must enter into operation within the deadlines set out in the table below, which run from the date of publication of the rankings:

Failure to comply with the above deadlines results in a reduction of the award price equal to (i) 0.2% for each month of delay during the first nine months; and (ii) 0.5% for each month of delay during the following six months, up to a maximum delay period of 15 months.

If this additional period is also exceeded, GSE shall revoke the project’s position in the ranking and call upon the performance bond. Furthermore, if the plant is subsequently readmitted to support mechanisms, a 5% reduction will apply to its award price.

If the applicant withdraws from its successful position in the ranking within six months of publication thereof, GSE shall call upon 30% of the performance bond. If such withdrawal is communicated between six and 12 months after publication of the ranking, GSE shall call upon 50% of the performance bond.

Notification of entry into operation

Plant owners must submit the application for access to the support mechanism to GSE within 90 days following the entry into operation date registered in Terna’s GAUDÌ system.

With respect to plants benefiting from direct access to the support mechanism, failure to submit the notification within the 90-day period results in the loss of entitlement to the award price for the period between the entry into operation date of the plant and the date on which the late notification is received. In any event, the notification must be submitted within 180 days following the entry into operation date registered in the GAUDÌ system, failing which the award price will not be granted.

With respect to plants participating in competitive procedures, failure to comply with the above-mentioned 90-day deadline results in:

1. loss of entitlement to the award price;
2. removal from the ranking; and
3. enforcement of the performance bond.

Payments

From the entry into operation date of a plant, GSE shall regulate payment of the award prices for a period of 20 years in accordance with the following rules:

(a) for plants with a capacity below 200 kW, GSE shall directly purchase and sell the electricity generated and shall pay the award price in the form of an all-inclusive tariff on the net electricity injected into the grid. Plant owners may alternatively opt for the regime below;

(b) for plants with a capacity equal to or above 200 kW, the electricity produced remains at the disposal of the producer, who is responsible for marketing it independently. GSE shall calculate the difference between the award price and the higher of zero and the reference price identified by the “Day-Ahead Market” price applicable during the relevant trading period and in the market zone where the contracted plant is located. Accordingly:
i) where the difference is positive, GSE shall pay an amount equal to such difference on the net electricity delivered to the grid; and
ii) where the difference is negative, GSE shall set off or request payment from the plant owner in an amount equal to such difference on the net electricity delivered to the grid.

The provisions concerning the execution of standard-form agreements to be entered into by applicants for the purpose of receiving the award price apply only to 95% of the electricity generated by plants with a capacity exceeding 1 MW that are admitted in an eligible position within the relevant ranking.

Certain exceptions to the above are expressly regulated by the FER X.

In cases of unlawful unilateral early termination of the agreement, beneficiaries are required to pay a penalty to GSE, the amount of which is determined according to the financial criteria set out in the FER X. GSE may require guarantees covering such amounts under the operational rules that will be issued to regulate access to the support mechanism.

The FER X also contains detailed provisions concerning payment settlement mechanisms, participation in electricity markets, negative price scenarios and situations of non-production due to grid requirements, all of which must be carefully taken into account