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Uniform Building Contractors Ltd v WASA (Trinidad and Tobago) [2026] UKPC 2 – A Privy Council decision on FIDIC Yellow Book variations and notice 9 February 2026

"The decision of the Board in Uniform Building Contractors Ltd v The Water and Sewerage Authority of Trinidad and Tobago [2026] UKPC 2 delivers a clear and unambiguous warning to contractors operating under FIDIC‑based design‑and‑build contracts."

The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“the Board”) in Uniform Building Contractors Ltd v The Water and Sewerage Authority of Trinidad and Tobago [2026] UKPC 2 delivers a clear and unambiguous warning to contractors operating under FIDIC‑based design‑and‑build contracts: compliance with notice provisions is not a technical nicety but a contractual condition precedent, falling foul of which is fatal to claims for additional payment.

The Board reversed the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, reinstating the High Court’s dismissal of the contractor’s claims for additional sums arising out of alleged variations. Central to the decision was the contractor’s failure to issue timely notices and to comply with the detailed machinery of the FIDIC Yellow Book (1999 Edition), including the mandatory requirement to submit variation proposals and claims within specified timeframes.

The judgment reinforces long‑established principles familiar to UK construction lawyers, that a contractor under a lump‑sum design‑and‑build arrangement bears the risk of foreseeable site conditions; that alleged instructions amounting to variations must be addressed through the contract’s own procedures; and that waiver or estoppel cannot lightly be invoked to circumvent express contractual requirements.

The Board was critical of the Court of Appeal’s reliance on informal site conduct and a perceived sense of fairness, emphasising that fairness must be understood in the context of the contract freely entered into.

For UK contractors and consultants, this case provides valuable guidance. It underscores the importance of maintaining meticulous contemporaneous records, issuing formal notices consistently and in strict accordance with FIDIC clause 20.1 or its equivalents, and ensuring that instructions asserted to constitute variations are processed correctly. It also highlights the commercial and legal risks of proceeding with additional work on the strength of informal site agreements or assumptions that the employer’s representative has authority to waive compliance.

Factual background

The dispute arose under a 2007 contract between the Water and Sewerage Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (“WASA”) and Uniform Building Contractors Ltd (“UBC”) for the design, supply and installation of approximately 28km of pipeline from Rio Claro to Mayaro. The contract incorporated the FIDIC Yellow Book (1999 Edition) alongside Conditions of Particular Application, Employer’s Requirements and a Bill of Quantities. It was a classic lump‑sum design‑and‑build arrangement in which the contractor assumed broad responsibility for both design and construction and for familiarisation with site conditions.

The works commenced in May 2007 and were terminated by WASA in May and June 2009 following disputes related to testing and compliance. Litigation followed. UBC commenced proceedings in 2013, close to expiry of the limitation period. Before the High Court, both UBC’s claim and WASA’s counterclaim were dismissed. UBC appealed and WASA did not challenge the dismissal of its counterclaim.

Before the Court of Appeal, UBC limited its claim to four discrete elements of work:

  1. laying pipework in the roadway (rather than in verges),
  2. removal of excavated material deemed unsuitable for backfill,
  3. importation of suitable backfill, and
  4. night‑time working.

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"UBC contended that each was a variation instructed or approved by the engineer."

UBC contended that each was a variation instructed or approved by the engineer. WASA denied that any of these items constituted variations and argued that, even if they did, UBC had failed to comply with the mandatory contractual procedures for claiming additional payment.

The Court of Appeal found for UBC, holding that the engineer had treated the four items as variations and that WASA had waived strict compliance with notice provisions. WASA appealed to the Privy Council.

UBC advanced its claims on the basis that the four items constituted variations under clause 13 of the FIDIC Yellow Book. It relied heavily on evidence from the engineer, Mr Paul, who asserted that he had approved the disputed works as variations. UBC contended that these items arose out of practical necessity during execution and thus fell outside the originally envisaged scope of works.

UBC further argued that, even if written notices were required under the contract, WASA had waived such requirements through its conduct, including its acceptance of the engineer’s guidance on site and its awareness of the additional costs incurred through increased material prices. The contractor also maintained that the strict FIDIC notice machinery no longer applied once the works had been terminated.

WASA resisted these claims on two principal bases. First, WASA maintained that none of the four items constituted a variation within the meaning of the contract. It argued that the Employer’s Requirements and Bill of Quantities contemplated excavation in any material encountered, disposal of unsuitable material, importation of suitable backfill, and the possibility of night working subject to noise restrictions.

Second, WASA submitted that, even if any of the disputed items were variations, UBC had failed to comply with the mandatory variation and claims procedures under clauses 13 and 20.1. These included the need to issue notices within the 28‑day window provided in clause 20.1 and the requirement to submit proposals and obtain determinations under clause 3.5. WASA argued that these requirements constituted a contractually binding condition precedent to entitlement. It denied any waiver or estoppel and denied that the engineer had authority to amend or waive contractual requirements.

Legal points considered by the Board

The Privy Council examined four central questions: (i) whether the four items were variations as defined under the FIDIC contract; (ii) whether UBC had complied with the variation procedure; (iii) whether UBC had failed to comply with a condition precedent by not issuing notice under clause 20.1; and (iv) whether the Court of Appeal was correct to rely on notions of fairness and waiver.

On variations, the Board held that the Court of Appeal had erred by failing to analyse the contract terms. The construction of a variation turns primarily on whether the alleged instruction changes the Employer’s Requirements, or the Works as defined. The Board emphasised that, under a design‑and‑build lump‑sum contract, the contractor bears the risk of the sufficiency of its design and pricing. It concluded that cutting the asphalt roadway, disposing of unsuitable material, importing backfill and undertaking night work were all activities expressly or impliedly included within UBC’s contractual scope. For that reason, they were not considered as variations.

"On variations, the Board held that the Court of Appeal had erred by failing to analyse the contract terms."

On the notice and procedural machinery, the Board found that, even if the works had been variations, UBC had wholly failed to comply with clauses 3.6, 13.1–13.3 and 20.1. The requirement to notify claims within 28 days under clause 20.1 was construed as a strict condition precedent, failure of which extinguished UBC’s entitlement to any additional payment. The Board rejected the Court of Appeal’s view that the termination of the contract displaced these requirements, observing that termination operates prospectively and cannot revive rights which have expired under the contract.

The Board further held that the Court of Appeal erred in its finding of waiver or estoppel. Waiver and estoppel had not been pleaded, no evidence supporting their essential elements had been led at trial, and there was no evidence that WASA, as a contracting party, had made any representation that it would not rely on the notice provisions. The engineer could not, as a matter of contract, waive or amend the contractual requirements, as clause 3.1 expressly denied him such authority. Reliance on informal site conduct and retrospective impressions of fairness could not supplant clear contractual requirements.

The decision

The Privy Council allowed the appeal, restoring the High Court’s judgment. It held that none of the disputed items constituted variations under the terms of the FIDIC contract. Even if any were variations, UBC’s failure to comply with the strict procedural requirements, and especially the failure to issue timely notice under clause 20.1, was fatal. Clause 20.1 was a condition precedent that barred recovery. The Board rejected the Court of Appeal’s reliance on waiver, estoppel and fairness, finding these arguments were unsupported by pleadings or evidence and inconsistent with the express limitations placed on the Engineer’s authority in clause 3.1.

Implications for contractors and the UK construction industry

Although the case arose from Trinidad and Tobago, the decision will resonate strongly within the UK construction community, particularly for those using FIDIC forms or other contracts with strict notice‑and‑claim regimes, such as NEC and JCT amendments incorporating condition‑precedent notice provisions.

The first implication is the reaffirmation that notice provisions in FIDIC contracts are enforceable as strict conditions precedent. Contractors who fail to notify claims within the stipulated period will lose entitlement, regardless of whether the employer was aware of the circumstances giving rise to the claim. This may seem harsh, but it is consistent with English authorities emphasising the importance of contractual certainty.

Secondly, the decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between the authority of the engineer or employer’s representative and that of the employer itself. Contractors must be cautious in assuming that informal assurances from an engineer constitute binding waivers. The Board’s strict analysis of clause 3.1 serves as a reminder that the engineer cannot amend or vary the contract, waive notice requirements or relieve the contractor of obligations.

"The first implication is the reaffirmation that notice provisions in FIDIC contracts are enforceable as strict conditions precedent."

Thirdly, contractors must avoid relying on retrospective arguments of fairness or project exigencies. The fact that work was performed in good faith, or that an engineer indicated that claims would be considered later, cannot circumvent express contractual machinery. Particularly under design‑and‑build forms, contractors must take great care in documenting instructions, issuing Confirmation of Verbal Instruction (COVI) notices and ensuring that variation procedures are meticulously followed.

Fourthly, the case highlights the commercial danger of commencing additional or changed work without first securing clear and contractually compliant instructions. In the UK context, where variations and claims can easily involve sums vastly exceeding those in dispute in this case, failure to issue notices may expose contractors to catastrophic financial consequences.

Finally, the decision reinforces the importance of contemporaneous documentation. The Privy Council placed significant weight on the paucity of contemporaneous records in rejecting UBC’s claims. UK contractors should view this as a reminder of the value of disciplined project administration, especially under FIDIC, NEC and other forms that translate real‑time procedural compliance into entitlement.

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