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Should I Stay or Should I Go? Court of Appeal guidance for charterers when owners nominate a port or place convenient for repossession5 November 2025

"The Songa Pride provides useful guidance on the interpretation of the BIMCO Barecon 2001 standard form."

The Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC, The Songa Pride [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 (the “Songa Pride”) provides useful guidance on the interpretation of the BIMCO Barecon 2001 standard form, in an area where disputes are often arbitrated and therefore confidential.

The judgment in the Songa Pride concerns the interpretation of clause 29 of Barecon 2001, which relates to the right to repossess the vessel in the event of a charter’s termination. The position differs between a bareboat charter and a time charter. During the charterparty period, the vessel was “in the full possession and at the absolute disposal” of the charterer.

Summary of facts

Charterers purported to terminate the charter under clause 28 of Barecon 2001 on the basis of a termination event triggered by the insolvency of owners’ guarantor. The vessel was at Stockton, California when the charterers terminated the charter and notified the owners that she was ready for them to repossess. The owners refused to repossess her at Stockton and instead insisted she sail to Trogir, Croatia for repossession where it was allegedly more convenient for the owners. Charterers sailed under protest to Trogir and arrested the vessel at Gibraltar. Owners eventually took possession of the vessel after providing adequate security to the Gibraltar courts.

On 13 January 2022 charterers commenced LMAA arbitration proceedings against the owners to claim their costs of running the vessel from 14 May 2021 (when they purported to terminate the charter) to 7 January 2022 (when the owners eventually repossessed the Vessel). The LMAA tribunal found in favour of the owners, who argued they were entitled to nominate a convenient port for repossession and that Stockton was not convenient.

On 22 April 2024 the charterers sought leave to appeal the arbitration award to the High Court on a question of law under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.

Clause in dispute

The contentious wording (our own emphasis) in the first sentence of clause 29 was: “In the event of the termination of this Charter in accordance with the applicable provisions of Clause 28, the Owners shall have the right to repossess the Vessel from the Charterers at her current or next port of call, or at a port or place convenient to them without hindrance or interference by the Charterers, courts or local authorities. Pending physical repossession of the Vessel in accordance with Clause 29, the Charterers shall hold the vessel as gratuitous bailee only to the Owners.”

Clause 29 also provides that: “The Owners shall arrange for an authorised representative to board the vessel as soon as reasonably practicable following the termination of the Charter. The Vessel shall be deemed to be repossessed … upon [the] boarding of the Vessel by the Owners’ representative…”.

The dispute

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"Clause 29 tackles the potentially tricky issue of repossession of a vessel following a charter’s termination under clause 28."

Clause 29 tackles the potentially tricky issue of repossession of a vessel following a charter’s termination under clause 28.

The dispute concerned whether clause 29 entitled the owners to require the charterers to sail to Trogir. That question of law can be summarised by the following two questions:

  1. are owners required to repossess a vessel as soon as practicable, so long as the location of the vessel is objectively convenient for such repossession? (i.e. the owners can put an authorised representative and crew onboard in the usual way); or
  2. are charterers obliged to sail to a location nominated by owners on the basis that place is considered more convenient for owners to repossess the vessel?

First instance decision

The judge at first instance found in favour of charterers on appeal and made the following key observations:

  1. clauses 28 and 29 of the BIMCO Barecon 2001 standard form bareboat charter should be read together. Clause 28 deals with termination of a charter and clause 29 deals with repossession. Clause 28 deals with scenarios where an owner terminates the charter and scenarios where a charterer terminates. Therefore, the judge at first instance did not consider it probable that clause 29 was intended to always require delivery to an owner at a port of their choice in circumstances where it could have feasibly been the owner who terminated the charter;
  2. because a charterer delivering a vessel for repossession is a gratuitous bailee pending repossession (i.e. is required to take good care of the vessel until she is delivered), charterers will inevitably incur costs doing so. The judge at first instance found that it could not have been the parties’ intention that the owner would have an unqualified entitlement to choose where to repossess the vessel in circumstances where the charterer was bearing the costs of her operation and maintenance until she was delivered to owners for repossession; and
  3. clause 29 requires an owner to “arrange for an authorised representative to board the vessel as soon as reasonably practicable following the termination of the Charter”, and the vessel would be deemed repossessed upon the boarding of that representative. The judge at first instance said that, as a matter of construction of the words of clause 29, if the owner’s authorised representative was able to board at her current port of call, that was “as soon as reasonably practicable” and therefore they should have boarded at Stockton and repossessed the vessel there.

That latter point was the one which was deemed decisive by the first instance judge.

Court of Appeal’s decision

The owners then appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the decision of the first instance judge, deciding in favour of the charterers. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the charterers for five key reasons.

  1. No Express wording: if clause 29 was intended to give owners a right to nominate a location for repossession, the parties could have included such wording. The clause did not do this, but expressly referred to delivery at “her current or next port”.
  2. Commercial common sense: the words “her current or next port” reflect the fact that the vessel might have been in port (her current port) or at sea (heading for her next port) at the time of termination. The Court of Appeal said it did not make legal or commercial sense for the wording to require charterers to sail to a port of the owners’ election when the vessel was already in port because, upon termination of the charter, there was no longer any “next port” and because the owners would not have had any involvement in where her “next port” was. That latter point is because charterers under a bareboat charter have full operational control of a vessel and therefore determine its employment with no/limited reference to owners. This is also ties in with the Court of Appeal’s comment that the repossession provisions in clause 29 must be considered in the context of the legal and commercial nature of a bareboat charter.
  3. Swift and practical repossession: the sentences in clause 29 should be read together to determine what any other sentence in the clause means. The right of owners to repossess the vessel should be read considering the obligation imposed on them to place a representative on board “as soon as reasonably practicable”.
  4. Obvious fall-back: the additional words “or at a port or place convenient to [Owners]” are clearly intended to be a fall-back where a vessel’s “current or next port” is not convenient for taking possession.
  5. No implied obligation to sail: clause 29 does not impose an express obligation on charterers to sail the vessel to another port. Implying such an obligation would require charterers to undertake an additional voyage at their own expense, at the risk of owners being unable or unwilling to indemnify them.

"The legal and commercial features of a bareboat charter were relevant to the Court of Appeal’s understanding of clause 29."

Summary

On initial glance, the wording of clause 29 may appear clear and owners are therefore entitled to elect “a port or place convenient to them” to repossess the vessel.

However, the Court of Appeal interpreted clause 29 narrowly and found that this did not mean the owners could insist the charterers sail the vessel from Stockton to Trogir (the place where owners had a yard and personnel). The Court of Appeal therefore agreed with the judge that if the vessel is at a port when the charterparty is terminated under clause 29, the repossession by the owners must take place at that port unless it is impractical or impossible to do so.

The Court of Appeal’s approach to interpretation focussed on the “ordinary natural meaning” of contractual language and construed clause 29 in its documentary, factual and commercial context (following the principles of interpretation in the Arnold v Britton case).

Further, the legal and commercial features of a bareboat charter were relevant to the Court of Appeal’s understanding of clause 29. When a charter terminates – due to certain events – the vessel is no longer at the charterers’ disposal and they are no longer required to pay hire to owners, or operate, maintain or insure the vessel. However, as owners are now left without those protections or payments, they should be allowed to repossess the vessel at the first opportunity, namely the current or next port of call and charterers shall, “hold the vessel as gratuitous bailee only to the Owners” under clause 29. As charterers have a minimum obligation to care for the vessel as gratuitous bailees, owners should repossess the vessel as soon as reasonably possible to relieve them of that unremunerated burden.

The case deals with whether an owner can nominate a port to repossess, irrespective of whether there is a more convenient port or place to repossess. That clarity in the law is beneficial to owners agreeing bareboat charters on Barecon standard wording, who may want to consider amending the standard wording should they wish to have a broad discretion as to the place of repossession.

The amendment of that clause however is often more likely to be of significance in lease finance transactions for a finance lessor needing to take possession of a vessel, upon the lease being terminated. Finance lessors are not in the same practical position as vessel owners to repossess a vessel as they would have to instruct managers etc. which is not the usual business of typical finance lessors. Finance lessors who do not amend the standard wording therefore may be discouraged from terminating the charter because they are not in a practical position to repossess the vessel. This case is therefore a reminder for all that the repossession clause should be specifically considered when agreeing terms.

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